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SECRETARY OF INTERIOR v. CALIFORNIA: SHOULD 
CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE SALES BE SUBJECT 
TO CONSISTENCY REVIEW? 
Dr. Edward A. Fitzgerald* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Outer continental shelf oil and gas resource development has 
generated a great deal of conflict between the federal and state 
governments. The outer continental shelf (OCS) consists of sub-
merged land lying beyond the three-mile limit of the coastal zone 
of states bordering the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.1 While the 
coastal zone is under state jurisdiction,2 the OCS is under the 
jurisdiction of the federal government.3 The Department of the 
Interior (Interior) is authorized to lease tracts on the OCS to 
industry for the development of oil and gas resources and to 
regulate such activity.4 
The federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA)5 
provides that federal activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone 
must not conflict or interfere with state coastal zone management 
programs established under the CZMA.6 On January 11, 1984 the 
Supreme Court decided Secretary of Interior v. California.7 The 
Court held that OCS lease sales by the Department of the Interior 
do not "directly affect" the coastal zone within the terms of the 
* Assistant Professor, St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota; B.A. 1971, Holy 
Cross College; J.D. 1974, Boston College Law School; M.A. 1976, Northeastern Univer-
sity; Ph.D. 1983, Boston University. 
1 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982). 
2 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1) (1982). 
3 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1) (1982). 
4 The Department of the Interior is delegated the authority to administer the OCS 
leasing process by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982). 
5 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1464 (1982). 
6 Id. at § 1456(c)(1). 
7 _ U.S. _, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984). 
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CZMA and therefore are not subject to consistency review under 
section 307(c)(1) of the Act.8 This decision was a defeat for the 
states in their struggle to participate effectively in the OCS 
energy development process. 
The CZMA was enacted "to preserve, protect, develop, and 
where possible to restore or enhance" the coastal environment.9 
The Act makes federal funding available to each coastal state for 
the deveiopment10 and administrationll of a comprehensive coas-
tal zone management program regulating the use of coastal 
areas' land and water resources of coastal areasP Section 307(c)(1) 
of the Act provides that all federal activity "directly affecting" the 
coastal zone13 must be conducted "in a manner which is, to the 
maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state 
management programs."14 The Supreme Court's narrow interpre-
tation of "directly affecting" in Interior v. California undermines 
the meaningful role Congress established for the states in the 
OCS development process. The states are now relegated to being 
mere advisors, rather than cooperative partners, during the cru-
cial early planning stages of the process. This frustrates the policy 
and purpose of the Coastal Zone Management Act.15 Further-
more, the Supreme Court's decision is not supported by legislative 
history16 or administrative interpretations17 of the CZMA, nor by 
the district18 and circuit court19 opinions in the case. 
The issue of whether the CZMA's consistency requirement 
applies to outer continental shelf lease sales 20 was the focus of 
controversy between the State of California and the Department 
of Interior beginning in 1980. California asserted that Lease Sale 
" [d. at 658. 
9 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1982). 
10 [d. at § 1454. 
11 [d. at § 1455. 
12 [d. at § 1453(11) (1982). 
13 [d. at § 1456(c)(I) (1982). 
14 [d. 
15 See id. at §§ 1451, 1452 (1982). 
16 See infra text and notes at notes 5-6. 
17 [d. 
18 State of California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
19 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). 
20 The term oes lease sale refers to the Final Notice of Sale, which conclusively 
establishes the size of the lease sale, the location of the OCS tracts to be offered for 
leasing, the date on which the leases will be sold, and the conditions or stipulations to 
which the leases will be subject. 43 C.F.R. 3315.4{a) (1979). The lease sale makes final all 
federal pre-lease decisions and is the last exclusively federal stage in the OCS leasing 
and development process. 
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53 directly affected its coastal zone and that consequently a con-
sistency determination was warranted.21 The Department of the 
Interior strongly disagreed.22 When negotiations failed to resolve 
the dispute, California brought suit in U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California.23 
The district court held for California,24 and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.25 Both courts adopted the 
state's interpretation of the CZMA's phrase "directly affecting." 
The Ninth Circuit ruled, "[d]ecisions made at the leasing stage [of 
OCS energy development] establish the basic scope and charter 
for subsequent development and production."26 Accordingly, 
Interior was enjoined from taking any further action in Lease 
Sale 53 regarding offshore tracts which California maintained 
ought not be developedP 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision,28 and 
held that only federal activity conducted within the geographical 
confines of the coastal zone can "directly affect" the coastal zone 
within the meaning of the CZMA.29 The Court decided that OCS 
lease sales by the Department of the Interior are not subject to 
the requirement of section 307(c)(1).30 Consequently, Interior was 
21 Letter from Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Com-
mission, to Cecil B. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior (July 8, 1980). 
CZMA regulations provide that the federal agency conducting an activity directly 
affecting the coastal zone must submit a consistency determination to each affected 
state. The consistency determination is a document describing how the federal activity 
has been tailored to be consistent with the state coastal zone management program. 15 
C.F.R. §§ 930.34(a), 930.39 (1979). The state has 45 days to review the consistency deter-
mination and notify the federal agency of its agreement or objections. I d. at § 930.4l(a). If 
a federal agency determines that a proposed activity does not "directly affect" the 
coastal zone, it must so notify adjacent states in a "negative determination." Id. at 
930.35(d). If the federal agency and a state have a disagreement about these determina-
tions, either party may request the Secretary of Commerce to mediate the dispute. I d. at 
930.110-.116. See generally Linsley, Federal Consistency and Outer Continental Shelf Oil 
and Gas lAasing: The Application of the "Directly Affecting" Test to Pre-Lease Sale 
Activities, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 431, 440-42 (1980). 
22 Letter from Larry E. Meierotto, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to Michael L. 
Fischer (Oct. 22, 1980). 
23 State of California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
24 520 F. Supp. at 1365. 
25 683 F.2d at 1253. 
2. Id. at 1260. 
27 Id. 
28 Secretary of the Interior v. California, _ U.S. _, 104 S. Ct. at 658. 
29 Id. at 666. 
30 Id. at 667. 
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not required to submit a consistency determination to the state of 
California before issuing a Final Notice of Sale for Lease Sale 53.31 
This article will first review the factual background and events 
leading up to the litigation over Lease Sale 53. The article will 
then examine the judicial opinions in Interior v. California at the 
various stages in the case. The Supreme Court's decision will then 
be analyzed. Finally, two bills designed to overturn the Supreme 
Court's decision will be examined. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LEASE SALE 53 LITIGATION 
A. The Lease Sale 48 Controversy 
The issue of whether OCS lease sales must be consistent with 
state coastal management programs under section 307(c)(1) of the 
CZMA was first raised in the controversy surrounding Lease Sale 
48, which took place in 1979.32 This lease sale also involved tracts 
off the coast of California, and the controversy it generated 
foreshadowed the conflict that was later to develop over Lease 
Sale 53. Furthermore, an opinion letter written by the Depart-
ment of Justice in the Lease Sale 48 controversy became an 
important factor in the litigation surrounding Lease Sale 53.3.'3 
California's coastal zone management program was established 
by one of the most comprehensive state coastal protection laws 
ever enacted.34 California has consistently taken an active role in 
coastal zone and OCS planning and development.35 The California 
Coastal Commission (CCC) asked Interior to conduct a consistency 
determination for the Final Notice of Sale for Lease Sale 48,36 
taking the position that a Final Notice of Sale "directly affected" 
the California coastal zone. The Final Notice of Sale is the step in 
the OCS leasing and development process which conclusively es-
31 Id. at 672. 
32 For a complete discussion of Lease Sale 48, see Linsley, supra note 21, at 456-74. 
33 See California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1380. 
34 California Coastal Act of 1976, Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977 and 
Supp. 1980). The California Coastal Zone Management Program was approved by the 
Commerce Department pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1455 in 1978. Interior v. California, 104 S. 
Ct. at 659. See generally, Coastal Futures: Legal Issues Affecting the Development of the 
California Coast, 2 STAN. ENVTL. L. ANN. 1 (1979). 
35 See Linsley, supra note 21, at 457 n.123. 
36 CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, PosrrION OF THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL COM-
MISSION THAT THE NOTICE SALE FOR LEASE SALE No. 48 DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE 3 (paper presented at the Department of Commerce Media-
tion Hearing-Sept. 7, 1979). 
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tablishes the size of the lease sale, the location of tracts to be 
leased, the timing of the lease sale, and the conditions or stipula-
tions to which the leases are subject.37 Interior refused the re-
quest on the grounds that federal pre-leasing activities did not 
"directly affect" the coastal zone within the terms of the CZMA 
and thus were not subject to the consistency requirement.38 After 
a mediation effort by the Department of Commerce failed to 
resolve the dispute,39 Interior and Commerce jointly requested an 
opinion from the Department of Justice concerning the applicabil-
ity of section 307(c)(1) to OCS lease sales.40 
In its opinion issued April 20, 1979,41 the Justice Department 
refused to decide if Interior's pre-lease activities in Lease Sale 48 
directly affected California's coastal zone.42 This issue was charac-
terized as a factual question outside of the Justice Department's 
jurisdiction.43 However, the Justice Department did state that in 
general Interior's pre-lease activities were subject to consistency 
review under CZMA section 307(c)(1), if these activities did, in fact, 
directly affect the coastal zone.44 
Even though the Justice Department did not explicitly support 
California's position in the Lease Sale 48 dispute, it did reject the 
interpretation of the CZMA which had been advanced by Inter-
ior.45 Interior had asserted that CZMA section 307(c)(3)(b),46 
enacted in 1976, superseded section 307(c)(1) regarding OCS devel-
opment.47 Section 307(c)(3)(b) explicitly requires a consistency re-
37 43 C.F.R. 3315.4(a) (1979). 
38 DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, CONSISTENCY OF PRE-LEASING ACTIVITIES: STATE-
MENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FOR MEDIATION REGARDING OCS LEASE 
SALE No. 48 (Paper presented at the Department of Commerce Mediation Hearing-Oct. 
18, 1979) [hereinafter cited as INTERIOR PosmON PAPER]. 
39 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) provides that "[i]n the case of serious disagreement between any 
Federal agency and a coastal state ... the Secretary [of Commerce], with the cooperation 
of the Executive Office of the President, shall seek to mediate the differences in such a 
disagreement." 
40 Letter from William V. Skidmore, Acting General Counsel of the Department of 
Commerce, and Frederick N. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor of the Department of the 
Interior, to John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 
23, 1979). 
41 Department of Justice Advisory Opinion rendered for the Department of Commerce 
and the Department of the Interior (Apr. 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOJ Opinion]. 
42 Id. at 12-14. 
43 Id. at 14, citing 28 Op. A.G. 218, 222 (19 Op. A.G. 425, 428 (1940». 
44 Id. at 1(}'11. 
45 Id. at 2. 
46 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982). 
47 DOJ Opinion, supra note 41, at 2. 
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view before any exploration and development permit is issued for 
a particular leased offshore tract. Interior maintained that its 
pre-lease decisions were per se exempt from the CZMA's require-
ments.48 The Justice Department disagreed. It ruled that while 
section 307(cX3)(b) "simplifies the regulatory process during the 
post-leasing period," the new subsection "has no bearing on the 
consistency requirements antedating that stage of the process."49 
The Department of Justice explained that repeal by implication 
is not a doctrine that should be afforded great respect.50 Since 
Congress did not intend to repeal section 307(c)(1) by enacting 
section 307(c)(3)(b), and since the mandates of both sections did not 
conflict, the opinion letter ruled that both sections ought to be 
given effect.51 Accordingly, in the view of the Justice Department, 
section 307(c)(1) applied to the pre-lease stage, while section 
307(c)(3)(b) pertained to post-lease sale activities.5~ 
Despite the Justice Department's opinion, on May 25, 1979 
Interior informed the CCC that no consistency determination 
would be conducted for Lease Sale 48 because Interior's pre-
leasing activities did not in fact directly affect California's coastal 
zone.53 Interior did take several steps to meet California's objec-
tions.54 The Commission then decided that Lease Sale 48 was, for 
the most part, consistent with the California coastal management 
program.55 
Nevertheless, the CCC, seeking to establish a favorable prece-
dent, requested the Secretary of Commerce to mediate the dis-
pute over whether the Final Notice of Sale in Lease Sale 48 was 
48 Letter from William V. Skidmore, Acting General Counsel of The Department of 
Commerce and Frederick N. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor of The Department of the 
Interior, to John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 
23, 1979). 
49 DOJ Opinion, supra note 41, at 10. 
50 Id. The DOJ opinion stated that the Supreme Court has "consistently applied the 
rule that repeals by implication are not favored; that the intention of the legislation to 
repeal must be clear and manifest; that every attempt must be made to reconcile the 
statutes involved; and that a repeal by implication will be found only where there is a 
'positive repugnancy' between the statutes in question," citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 
U.S. 535, 549-50 (1974); Borden v. U.S., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939). 
51 DOJ opinion, supra note 41, at 10. 
52 Id. 
53 Letter from Heather L. Ross, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Interior, to Michael L. 
Fischer, Executive Director of the CCC (May 1979). 
54 Linsley, supra note 21, at 460-61. 
55 Id. 
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subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1) of CZMA.56 
The mediation conference was held on October 19, 1979. The 
mediation officer's report determined that pre-lease activities 
were indeed subject to section 307(c)(1),s consistency determina-
tion requirement.57 However, the voluntary, non-binding media-
tion proceeding failed to resolve the dispute. This prompted the 
Secretary of Commerce to instruct the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the agency charged with 
administering the CZMA, to develop new regulations defining the 
phrase "directly affecting" in section 307(c)(1).58 
The Lease Sale 48 controversy did not resolve the issue of 
whether OCS lease sales are federal activities "directly affecting" 
the coastal zone and thus subject to section 307(c)(1)'s require-
ment that they be consistent with state coastal zone management 
programs. This issue reemerged during the preparations for 
Lease Sale 53 and became the subject of lengthy litigation cul-
minating with the Supreme Court's interpretation of "directly 
affecting" in Interior v. California. 
B. The Lease Sale 53 Controversy: 
Events Leading to Interior v. California 
The Department of Interior's preparations for Lease Sale 53 
began in 1977. Lease Sale 53 initially included tracts located in 
five distinct areas off the California coast: the Santa Maria Basin, 
the Point Arena Basin, the Bodega Basin, the Santa Cruz Basin, 
and the Eel River Basin. Although Interior later deferred offer-
ing the tracts located in four of these areas, when Lease Sale 53 
took place in May 1981 it was the second largest in OCS history.59 
In July, 1980 the California Coastal Commission requested the 
Secretary of Interior to submit a consistency determination for 
Lease Sale 53 when the proposed Notice of Sale was issued.60 On 
56 Letter from Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Com-
mission, to Jimmy Carter, President of the United States (Dec. 5, 1978). The CZMA 
provides that the Executive Branch will provide assistance in resolving "serious dis-
agreements" arising under the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1982). 
57 Memorandum of C.L. Haslam, General Counsel to the Department of Commerce, to 
Phillip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce (Jan. 25, 1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 
1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 82-84 (1980). 
5. Letter from Phillip M. Klutznick to Cecil D. Andrus (Feb. 27, 1980), reprinted in H.R. 
REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 79-80 (1980). 
59 683 F.2d at 1258; 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 196 (June 5, 1981). 
60 See infra text and notes at note 21. 
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October 22, 1980, six days after the proposed Notice of Sale was 
issued, the Secretary notified the CCC that no consistency deter-
mination would be conducted because Interior had determined 
that Lease Sale 53 would not directly affect the California coastal 
zone.61 At the same time, however, the Secretary nullified many of 
the Commission's objections to the sale by eliminating all of the 
tracts in four of the five basins originally scheduled for leasing 
because of environmental reasons.62 The remaining tracts to be 
leased in the lease sale were located in the Santa Maria Basin, off 
the coast of California:l:3 
The Commission admitted that Interior's elimination of tracts 
in the four basins satisfied most of the state's initial objections.64 
Nevertheless, the CCC requested that 31 of the traets in the 
remaining Santa Maria Basin be eliminated from the sale be-
cause "leasing within 12 miles from the Sea Otter Range in the 
Santa Maria Basin would not be consistent" with California's 
coastal management program.65 California Governor Edmund G. 
Brown made similar recommendations.66 
On February 10, 1981 the newly appointed Secretary of Interior, 
James G. Watt, issued a revised proposed Notice of Sale for Lease 
Sale 53.67 The four basins which had been part of the original sale 
proposal were included in the revised notice, along with the dis-
puted tracts in the Santa Maria Basin. The reason given by 
Interior for the re-inclusion of tracts in the four basins was that 
Governor Brown had never fully commented on them.6!! On April 
7, 1981 Governor Brown, responding to the new proposed Notice of 
Sale, reiterated his earlier recommendations.69 
On April 10, 1981 the Secretary announced that Lease Sale 53 
would be divided into two sales: lease sale of the tracts in the 
Santa Maria Basin would take place in May, while the sale of 
61 683 F.2d at 159. 
62 I d. at 1259. 
63 I d. at 1258·59. 
64 Id. 
65 Brief for the Petitioners on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit at 12, State of California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Interior Brief]. 
66 Id. 
67 683 F.2d at 1259. Under section 10 of the OCSLA, governors of affected states may 
submit comments and recommendations on a proposed Notice of Sale for an OCS Lease 
sale. 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3315.2(a) (1979). 
68 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2024 (Feb. 20, 1981). 
69 683 F.2d at 1259. 
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tracts in the other basins would be postponed indefinitely to 
permit a full study of Governor Brown's recommendations.70 
However, Interior declared that it would not follow Governor 
Brown's recommendation to withdraw tracts in the Santa Maria 
Basin on the ground that the recommendation did not strike a 
reasonable balance between national and state interests.71 On 
April 27, 1981, Interior issued the Final Notice of Sale, announc-
ing May 28, 1981 as the sale date.72 
III. THE LEASE SALE 53 LITIGATION 
A. California v. Interior In Federal District Court 
On April 28, 1981 the State of California 73 brought suit in federal 
district court seeking to enjoin the sale of 29 of the tracts74 in the 
Santa Maria Basin.75 A coalition of environmental groupS/6 led by 
the National Resources Defense Council, brought a similar suit.77 
The states of Alabama, Massachusetts, Oregon, the Coastal 
States Organization, and the National Governors Conference filed 
amicus briefs in support of the injunction.78 The Western Oil and 
Gas Association and several member oil companies79 intervened 
in the case to support Interior's position. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. Section 19 of the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982), requires the Secretary of 
Interior to accept the recommendations of governors of coastal states affected by OCS 
development concerning the "size, timing, or location of a proposed lease sale," only if 
such recommendations "provide for a reasonable balance between the national interests 
and the well-being of the citizens of the affected States." I d. This standard appears to be 
significantly less stringent than the CZMA's consistency requirement. See Linsley, 
supra note 21, at 481. 
12 683 F.2d at 1259. 
13 The plaintiffs in the case were the State of California, California Coastal Commis-
sion, California Air Resources Board, California Resources Agency, California Depart-
ment of Fish and Game, and California Department of Conservation. Several cities and 
counties, located on or near the California coast, intervened as plaintiffs in the case. 
14 Interior consolidated several tracts before issuing the Final Notice of Sale. Al-
though the area in question remained the same, the number of tracts was reduced from 
115 to 111. Consequently, the number of tracts objected to by the CCC changed from 31 to 
29, and the number of tracts subject to the governor's recommendation declined from 34 
to 32. Interior Brief, supra note 65, at 14 n.15. 
15 California v. Watt, No. 81-2080 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 29, 1981). 
16 Joining the NRDC were the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Sea 
Otter, and the Environmental Coalition on Lease Sale 53. 
11 NRDC v. Watt, No. 81-2081 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 29, 1981). 
18 See Note, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development, 82 WIILAMETTE L. REV. 534, 553 (1982). 
79 The companies which remained part of the suit were those which had offered the 
high bids on the disputed tracts. See 520 F. Supp. at 1365. 
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The plaintiffs alleged that Lease Sale 53 directly affected Cali-
fornia's coastal zone.80 California alleged that Interior's failure to 
determine if Lease Sale 53 was consistent with California's coas-
tal management plan and submit to the CCC a consistency de-
termination violated section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA.81 In addition, 
the state maintained that any sale of leases on the disputed 29 
tracts in the Santa Maria Basin was not consistent with Califor-
nia's coastal management program because of the possible detri-
mental effects development would have on the sea otter and the 
gray whale, both endangered species.82 
The Department of the Interior maintained that Lease Sale 53 
did not directly affect California's coastal zone.83 Interior argued 
that "directly affecting" meant "without intervening cause."84 
Since the lease sale itself would not cause any physical alteration 
in the coastal zone, it could not directly affect the coastal zone.85 
Furthermore, activities which would occur during the explora-
tion, development, and production stages constituted intervening 
causes that were subject to consistency review under section 
307( c)(3)(B).86 
On May 27, 1981 the district court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion which prevented Interior "from accepting or rejecting any 
bids, issuing any leases, or taking any other action" regarding the 
disputed tracts in Lease Sale 53.87 The following day, May 28, 
Lease Sale 53 was held. Interior received bids totalling approxi-
mately 2.3 billion dollars in lease offerings, making the sale the 
second largest in OCS history.88 81 of the 111 tracts offered for 
lease received bids, including 21 of the disputed tracts89 in the 
Santa Maria Basin. However, the preliminary injunction issued 
80 Id. at 1368. The plaintiffs also claimed violations of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, OCSLA, Endangered Species Act, and Marine Mammal Protection Act. The 
district court resolved these issues in favor of the Interior. See 520 F. Supp. at 1382-89. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed these findings. See 683 F.2d at 1267-69. 
81 Interior Brief, supra note 65, at 14-15. 
82 Id. Interior Brief, supra note 65, at 14-15; Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. 
1533(a)(1). See Linsley, supra note 21, at 456-57, n.165. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 California v. Watt, No. 81-2080 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 1981)(order granting preliminary 
order). 11 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,565. 
88 12 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 197 (June 5, 1981). 
89 Id. 
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by the district court prevented Interior from accepting any bids 
on the disputed tracts until the case was resolved. 
1. Analysis of the District Court Opinion in California v. Watt 
On August 18, 1981 the district court issued its decision on the 
merits.90 The court held that the Final Notice of Sale for Lease 
Sale 53 directly affected California's coastal zone and was there-
fore subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1).91 The 
court's reasoning was based on six principles. 
First, the court determined that its interpretation of the CZMA 
was consistent with the purposes of the Act.92 The CZMA provided 
for comprehensive, coordinated, long-term federal-state planning 
to protect the coastal zone.93 OCS pre-lease decisions were crucial 
planning decisions which established the parameters of subse-
quent development.94 The lease sale set in motion a series of 
events leading to development.95 If participation was restricted to 
post-sale activities, the state would be "relegated to a defensive 
role of objecting to the proposals of individual lessees as they are 
presented."96 This would frustrate the orderly decision-making 
process and comprehensive planning scheme envisioned by Con-
gress.97 
Second, the court held that its interpretation of "directly affect-
ing" in section 307(c)(1) was supported by the legislative history of 
the CZMA.98 The language in the original bills passed by the 
House and Senate provided for consistency review of federal ac-
tivities occurring "in" the coastal zone.99 The conference commit-
tee substituted "directly affecting" for "in" the coastal zone.lOO 
Since the conference committee report was silent on the reasons 
for the change, the court asserted that the substitution 
90 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
91 Id. at 1377. 
92 Id. at 1369-71. The court held that "[e]ffectuating the purpose of a statute should be 
the primary concern of the court in construing the meaning of the disputed language," 
id. at 1369, citing Philibrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975). 
93 520 F. Supp. at 1369. 
94 I d. at 1371. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1371-74. 
99 H.R. 14146 § 307, reprinted in H.R. REP. 1049 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 3507 § 307, 
reprinted in S. REP. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
100 S. 3507 § 307, reprinted in H. CONF. R. 1544 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
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broadened the scope of section 307(c)(1) to include federal ac-
tivities occurring outside the coastal zone.101 
The CZMA was amended to deal with the impacts of OCS 
development in 1976.102 At that time Congress focused its atten-
tion on section 307(c)(3). OCS leasing was originally included in 
section 307(c)(3),t°3 but it was deleted during debate on the House 
floor.l04 It was not restored by the conference committee. How-
ever, the court reasoned that the exclusion of OCS leasing from 
section 307(c)(3) during the 1976 amendment process did not re-
peal the requirements independently imposed by section 
307(c)(1).I05 The sections had different concerns: section 307(c)(3) is 
directed primarily at the activities of lessees, while section 
307(c)(1) governs federal activities.loo Since there was nothing in 
the 1976 amendments which indicated that section 307(c)(3) was 
the exclusive provision dealing with OCS activities, the district 
court held the requirements of both sections should be given 
effect.107 
The CZMA was reauthorized in 1980.108 At that time, House and 
Senate reports both acknowledged that OCS leasing was subject 
to consistency review under section 307(c)(1).I09 The court found 
that these reports were important evidence of congressional in-
tent regarding the scope of the section. 110 
The third element of the district court's rationale was that 
applying section 307(c)(1) to federal pre-leasing decisions would 
not interfere with the operation of the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (OCSLA).111 Even though the CZMA and the OCSLA 
101 520 F. Supp. at 1371. 
102 Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 
1013 (1976) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1464). 
103 S. 586 § 307, reprinted in S. REP. 277 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 3981 § 307, 
reprinted in H.R. REP. 878 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
104 122 CONGo REC. 6128 (1976). 
105 520 F. Supp. at 1372. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060 
(1980). 
109 S. REP. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 28 (1980). 
110 520 F. Supp. 1373-74. The court held that "[w]hile subsequent legislative history 
generally is not controlling, neither should subsequent congressional interpretation be 
'rejected out of hand.'" Id. at 1373. Furthermore, "[t]he court should not overlook valu-
able sources in the search for legislative intent." Id. 
111 520 F. Supp. at 1374-76. OCSLA 43 U.S.C.§ 131 (1953), amended by OCLSA Amend-
ments, Pub. L. 95-372, 92 Stat 629 (1978). 
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have different concerns,112 the court ruled that their mandates are 
not incompatible.l13 The court recognized the two statutes did give 
the Secretary of Interior the difficult task of balancing energy 
development and environmental protection concerns,114 Neverthe-
less, the court refused to alter the statutory scheme established 
by Congress,115 
Fourth, the court held that its position was consistent with the 
administrative interpretation of section 307(c)(1) by the NOAA,116 
NOAA regulations had consistently supported an expansive 
definition for "directly affecting."117 In 1979, responding to the 
Justice Department's opinion,1l8 NOAA specifically subjected OCS 
lease sales to consistency review under section 307(c)(1),119 
Fifth, the court rejected Interior's interpretation of "directly 
affecting.m20 Interior had argued that the plain meaning of the 
phrase, according to Webster's Dictionary, was "effects resulting 
from an activity without intervening cause.m21 The court deter-
mined that Interior's reliance on the plain meaning rule was a 
"subterfuge.m22 Interior's definition was an amalgamation of two 
of the six definitions offered in Webster's, while four other defini-
112 Id. at 1375. The focus of the OCSLA is oil and gas development, while the CZMA 
centers on environmental protection. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 
1979). 
113 520 F. Supp. at 1376. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1377. 
116 Id. at 1376-78. The court cited the long-standing doctrine that "an agency's in-
terpretation of a statute is normally entitled to deference from the courts." Train v. 
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); API v. Knecht, 456 F. 
Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
117 42 Fed. Reg. 43586, 43591 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 10510, 10512 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 
37142-43 (1979). 
116 DOJ Opinion, supra note 41. 
119 44 Fed. Reg. 37142-43, 37146-47 (1979). The court noted that in 1981, two weeks after 
the complaints were filed in California v. Watt, NOAA had issued new CZMA regulations 
in which the Agency altered its position on the issue of the "directly affecting" test. 520 
F. Supp. at 1377-78. The district court refused to follow these new regulations, however, 
on the grounds that they were self-serving and contrary to NOAA's prior policy of 
encouraging long-range planning under the CZMA.Id. at 1378. 
120 California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp at 1378-80. 
121 Id. at 1378. 
122 Id. The plain meaning rule dictates that "where the language of an enactment is 
clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable 
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning 
intended." U.S. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). See generally 
Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation 
in the Modern Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975). 
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tions were ignored.l23 Furthermore, Interior's definition was con-
trary to congressional intent and frustrated the purposes of the 
CZMA.124 
Finally, the court held that the Final Notice of Sale for Lease 
Sale 53 did in fact directly affect California's coastal zone.125 The 
Final Notice of Sale contained ten stipulations which specified the 
actions permitted or required of lessees.l26 The Secretarial Issues 
Document127 and the Environmental Impact Statement prepared 
for the lease sale128 also listed the multiple effects the sale would 
have on the coastal zone, such as the "impacts upon air and water 
quality, marine and coastal ecosystems, commercial fisheries, rec-
reation and sport fishing, navigation, cultural resources, and 
socio-economic factors."129 
The district court accurately perceived that Congress intended 
the states to participate effectively during the early planning 
stages of the OCS energy development process. The court's posi-
tion is supported both by NOAA regulations and by the Justice 
Department's opinion. The court correctly concluded that Lease 
Sale 53 directly affected California's coastal zone and that there-
fore the sale was subject to consistency review under section 
307(c)(l) of the CZMA. Interior, however, decided to appeal the 
district court decision. 
B. Ninth Circuit Opinion 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concur-
ring with the lower court's interpretation of the CZMA.l30 The 
circuit court held that the Final Notice of Sale for Lease Sale 53 
was subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(l) because 
it was a federal activity directly affecting California's coastal 
zone.131 The court of appeals noted that federal pre-leasing deci-
sions, which become final upon the issuance of a Final Notice of 
[23 520 F. Supp. at 1378-79. 
[24 [d. at 1379-80. 
[25 [d. at 1380. 
[26 [d. 
[27 The Secretarial Issues Document is composed before a lease sale in order to help 
the Secretary of Interior arrive at a decision whether to lease. [d. at 1381. 
[28 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED 
OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE OFFSHORE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, OCS 
SALE No. 53 (1980). 
[29 520 F. Supp. at 1381. 
[30 State of California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982). 
[3[ [d. at 1260. 
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Sale, "establish the basic scope and charter for subsequent devel-
opment and production.1!l32 The lease sale stage is the only time 
each multi-stage OCS energy development project is evaluated in 
its entirety, and the only stage when the cumulative effect of 
offshore development on state costal resources is considered.l33 
The court asserted that a broad definition of "directly affecting" 
should be adopted in order to strengthen the state's ability to 
influence the events set in motion by OCS lease sales and to 
enhance the state's ability to protect its coastal zone.l34 The fun-
damental purpose and policy of the CZMA was to foster effective 
state protection of coastal resources. However, the court was 
careful to note that the Secretary of Interior, not the state, would 
determine whether the lease sale was consistent "to the maxi-
mum extent practicable,1!l35 with the California coastal manage-
ment program.136 
C. Lease Sale 53 In The Supreme Court: 
Interior v. California 
1. Arguments to the Supreme Court 
A brief look at Interior's and California's arguments to the 
Supreme Court will be helpful in assessing the impact the court's 
narrow interpretation has upon state-federal interaction during 
the OCS energy development process. The state of California's 
approach was policy-oriented, based upon the lower courts' deci-
sions in the case. California maintained that the most meaningful 
and practical time to evaluate federal OCS pre-leasing decisions 
for their consistency with state coastal management programs 
was before the basic terms of a lease sale were conclusively estab-
lished by a Final Notice of Sale. California supported its interpre-
tation of the CZMA with post-enactment Congressional interpre-
tation of the Act and with NOAA and Justice Department ad-
ministrative interpretations of the phrase "directly affecting." 
The Department of the Interior, by contrast, took a narrower 
approach to formulating the legal definition of the statutory 
phrase "directly affecting." Interior portrayed the OCS leasing 
132 ld. 
133 ld. 
134 ld. 
135 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982). 
136 683 F.2d at 1263-66. 
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and development process under the OCSLA and CZMA as a series 
of discrete phrases. Interior maintained that the role of a state's 
coastal management program was limited to stages involving 
physical alteration of the three-mile coastal zone. Interior sup-
ported its position primarily on the basis of the language and 
structure of CZMA section 307 and the OCSLA Amendments of 
1978. 
a. Interior's Arguments 
The Department of the Interior filed a petition for certiorari 
with the Supreme Court and the Court agreed to review the case. 
In its brief Interior first asserted that, "[s]ection 307(c)(l) limits 
consistency obligations to those federal activities that have a 
direct, identifiable impact on the coastal zone."137 Interior main-
tained that OCS lease sales did not directly affect the coastal zone 
because they did not produce any physical alteration of the coas-
tal zone.l3B Furthermore, Interior argued, subsequent activities 
occurring during the exploration, development and production 
stages did not constitute direct effects of federal leasing decisions 
because they were subject to consistency review and federal ap-
proval under 307(c)(3)(B).l39 Interior argued that to require consis-
tency review of the potential impacts of OCS development would 
thus undermine the statutory requirement of having to demon-
strate the direct effects of the federal action.l40 
Interior's second argument was that, "[t]he decision below runs 
contrary to a carefully crafted legislative scheme' that fully inte-
grates the CZMA into the OCS oil and gas process."l41 The DO I 
contended that the enactment of amendments dealing with OCS 
energy development to the CZMA and the OCSLA was an explicit 
recognition on the part of Congress that energy and environmen-
tal concerns could not be properly balanced during the early 
stages of development because insufficient information was 
available.l42 Consequently, Congress developed a phased 
decision-making process which separated the lease sale from the 
later stages of development.l43 This phased process ensured that 
137 Interior Brief, supra note 65, at 20. 
138 [d. at 21. 
139 [d. at 22. 
140 [d. at 21. 
141 [d. at 27. 
142 [d. at 27-30. 
143 [d. at 30. 
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decisions would be made only when adequate information was 
available.l44 
Interior's final contention was that "[l]imiting section 307(c)(1) 
to activities that directly affect the coastal zone fully implements 
the policies behind the CZMA and the OCSLA."145 The DOl as-
serted that the CZMA was concerned with "achieving sub-
stantive compliance, to the maximum extent practicable, with 
state coastal zone management programs."146 Congress deter-
mined that the most effective manner of accomplishing this was 
to postpone consistency review until the later stages of the pro-
cess.147 Furthermore, argued Interior, if OCS lease sales were 
subject to consistency determinations, the national interest in 
developing OCS resources could be frustrated.148 The Secretary of 
Interior might be prevented from proceeding because of errone-
ous assumptions concerning the hypothetical effects of such de-
velopment.l49 ' 
b. California's Arguments 
Responding to Interior's assertions, California in its brief first 
asserted that "[t]he lower courts had properly construed the 
meaning of 'directly affecting.' "150 California maintained that it 
was clear from the "plain meaning" of section 307(c)(1) that direct 
effects included "the intended uses of the property leased."1S1 The 
lease sale represented the first step in a series of events leading to 
development.1s2 The federal government's issuance of a Final 
Notice of Sale conclusively established which offshore tracts 
would be leased, as well as the basic terms of future exploration 
and production on these tracts.153 The fact that subsequent ac-
tivities on the part of the lessees were subject to state consistency 
review and federal approval did not make "the effects of the 
federal activity any less direct."154 California went on to point out 
144 Id. 
145 I d. at 41. 
146 Id. at 42. 
147 Id. at 43. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Brief in Opposition to Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at 9, State of California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.1982) 
[hereinafter cited as California Brief]. 
151 Id. at 10. 
152 Id. 
15:1 Id. 
154 Id. 
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that the courts have often held that environmental review is 
required "at the earliest possible time" in multi-stage decision-
making processes. l55 
California next argued that "Congress has determined that 
OCS lease sales must be consistent with approved costal man-
agement programs pursuant to section 307(c)(1)."156 California as-
serted that CZMA legislative history indicated that consistency 
determinations were to be prepared at the lease sale stage.157 The 
1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, which set 
forth the stages of the federal OCS leasing and development 
process, did not alter this requirement.158 In addition, this position 
was consistent with both prior lower federal court decisions as 
well as NOAA and Department of Justice interpretations of the 
CZMA.159 
California's final argument was that "[t]he decisions below will 
not disrupt OCS leasing or other federal activities."1OO California 
asserted that requiring consistency determinations for OCS lease 
sales would not delay energy development.161 On the contrary, 
such consistency determinations would likely reduce conflicts 
with the affected states, thereby avoiding delay at the later 
stages of the development process.162 
2. Interior v. California: the Supreme Court Opinion 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the case on No-
vember 1, 1983 and delivered its opinion on January 11, 1984.163 
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, held that 
only federal activities within the geographical boundaries of the 
coastal zone can directly affect the coastal zone.l64 The enactment 
of amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act setting 
forth the mechanics of the federal OCS leasing and development 
155 [d. at 13-18. California cited the following cases to support this contention. Scien-
tists Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079, 
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); California v. Watt, 
668 F.2d 1290, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
156 [d. at 19. 
157 [d. at 21-23. 
158 [d. 
159 [d. at 18-19. 
160 [d. at 26. 
161 [d. at 26-27. 
162 [d. 
163 _ U.S. _, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984). 
164 [d. at 666. 
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process reinforced this interpretation of Congressional intent.IB.'; 
Consequently, OCS lease sales were not subject to consistency 
review under section 307(c)(l).I66 
Finding no definition for the phrase "directly affecting" in the 
CZMA, Justice O'Connor turned to the legislative history of the 
Act.167 In the bills passed by the House and Senate in 1972, only 
federal activities occurring "in" the coastal zone were subject to 
consistency review. l68 However, the two CZMA bills defined coas-
tal zone differently. In the Senate bill, federal lands were excluded 
from the definition of coastal zone, whereas federal territory 
within 3 miles of shore were included in the House definition.169 
Justice O'Connor thus inferredl70 that the most plausible explana-
tion for the conference committee's substitution of "directly af-
fecting" for "in" the coastal zone was a "simple compromise" over 
the definition of coastal zone.l7l The substitution was not meant to 
expand the scope of section 307(c)(l) to include federal activities 
outside the 3-mile zone, like OCS lease sales.172 The substitution 
simply allowed the conference committee to retain the Senate's 
narrower definition of coastal zone, while making federal ac-
tivities occurring on federal lands physically within the coastal 
zone subject to consistency review, as urged by the House.173 
The majority opinion goes on to point out that during the 
enactment of the CZMA in 1972 Congress specifically rejected 
four proposals which would have extended CZMA provisions to 
activities conducted beyond the coastal zone.174 The first proposal 
was section 313 of the House bill, which would have required the 
Secretary of Commerce to develop a management program for 
the area three to twelve miles from shore.175 Federal activities 
occurring in the area immediately adjacent to state coastal zones 
would then be required to be consistent with state coastal man-
agement programs. The second proposal, section 312 of the House 
bill, would have allowed the extension of state estuarine 
In5 [d. at 668-71. 
Inn [d. at 672. 
1H7 [d. at 660-68. 
16S H.R. 14146, S. 3507, supra note 99. 
169 S. 3507 ~ 304(a), H.R. 14146 § 304(a), supra note 99. 
170 104 S. Ct. at 662. 
171 [d. at 662-63. 
172 [d. 
n:l [d. 
174 [d. at 663-66. 
175 H.R. 14146 § 313, supra note 99. 
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sanctuaries into the OCS.176 Two other proposals were made dur-
ing the debates on the Senate floor. One proposal would have 
granted coastal state governors a veto over OCS lease sales,177 
while the other authorized a study of the environmental effects of 
OCS drilling in the Atlantic.178 None of these proposed provisions 
were enacted. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor cited statements 
made during the floor debates which indicated that the CZMA 
was not to extend beyond the coastal zone.179 
Justice O'Connor explained that the intent of Congress at the 
time of the enactment of the CZMA was the controlling factor in 
determining the definition of "directly affecting.m80 Language in 
an earlier Senate Report, stating that federal activities having a 
functional relationship with the coastal zone should be conducted 
in a manner consistent with the state's program, was dismissed.1s1 
The statements in the congressional reports dealing with the 1976 
CZMA Amendmentsl82 and the 1980 reauthorization of the 
CZMN83 that OCS sales were subject to consistency review were 
also rejected.l84 Justice O'Connor maintained that such subse-
quent congressional statements were not helpful in eonstruing 
the intent of Congress at the time the CZMA was enacted.185 
These statements were characterized as "[l]egislative commit-
tees' desires to reaffirm positions they have taken that were 
[previously] rejected by the full Congress."186 
The Court ruled 187 that nothing in the other provisions of the 
CZMA compelledl88 a broader reading of section 307(c)(1).I8.'l Con-
gress clearly intended that the purposes of the CZMA be carried 
out without reaching federal activities occurring outside of the 
coastal zone.1oo Furthermore, the structure of section 307 indi-
mId. at § 312. 
177 104 S. Ct. 665 n.14, citing 118 CONGo REC. 14183 (1972). 
178 Id., citing 118 CONGo REC. 14191 (1972). 
179 104 S. Ct. at 663 n.11. 
180 Id. at 666 n.15. 
lSI S. REP. No. 526, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971). 
IB2 S. REP. 277, supra note 103, at 19-20. 
18:1 S. REP. 783, supra note 109, at 11, H.R. REP. 1012, supra note 109, at 28. 
1K4 104 S. Ct. at 665 n.15. 
I"' Id. 
186 Id. 
187 I d. at 666-67. 
18H I d. at 666. 
189 Id. at 666-67. 
190 I d. at 667. 
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cated that OCS lease sales were not intended to be covered by 
section 307(c)(1).191 
Justice O'Connor maintained that section 307(c)(3), not section 
307(c)(1), was the most pertinent regarding OCS lease sales.192 
Section 307(c)(1) deals with activities in which the federal gov-
ernment is the principal actor, while section 307(c)(3) deals with 
federally approved actions.193 In 1976 Congress specifically re-
jected the proposal to amend section 307(c)(3) to include leasing.l94 
Instead, Congress added a new subsection, 307(c)(3)(B),t95 which 
subjected federal OCS exploration, development and production 
permits to consistency review.l96 This exclusion of OCS leasing in 
1976 demonstrated explicit congressional intent not to subject 
OCS lease sales to consistency review, wrote Justice O'Connor.197 
The majority's second major argument concerned the relation-
ship between the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 
and the CZMA.198 Prior to the enactment of the OCSLA Amend-
ments of 1978, one could have argued that the issuance of an OCS 
lease triggered CZMA section 307(c)(3) on the grounds that the 
lease sale implied federal approval for the lessees' exploration and 
development plans.199 At that time OCSLA did not specify the 
consequences of the lease sale.2°O However, the OCSLA Amend-
ments of 1978 divided the OCS development process into four 
distinct phases: the development of the five-year leasing pro-
gram,201 the lease sale,202 exploration,203 and the development and 
production phase.204 A lease sale was clearly separated from the 
issuance of subsequent permits. Since the lease sale only entitled 
the lessee to priority in the submission of subsequent plans, it 
could not directly affect the coastal zone.205 Consistency review 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 I d. at 668. 
194 Id. at 668 n.18. 
195 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982). 
196 H. CONF. R. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976). 
197 104 S. Ct. at 668. 
198 Id. at 668-71. 
199 I d. at 669. 
200 I d. at 669. 
201 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). 
202 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a). 
203 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 
204 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 
205 104 S. Ct. at 670-71. 
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was reserved for the two later stages of the OCS development 
process under section 307(c)(3)(B).206 
Justice O'Connor noted that Congress had taken great pains to 
delineate the phased OCS development process, and to provide for 
coordination between the OCSLA and the CZMA.207 The Court 
concluded that this carefully balanced legislative scheme ought 
not be upset "by a superficially plausible, but ultimately unsup-
portable construction of two words in CZMA section 307(c)(1)."208 
3. Interior v. California: The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion in Interior v. California, written by Jus-
tice Stevens,209 was very critical of the majority's position. Justice 
Stevens asserted that the majority's view of the scope of section 
307(c)(l) contradicted the plain language,210 legislative history,2l1 
and purposes of the CZMA,212 as well as the lower courts' decisions 
in Interior v. California.213 Furthermore, legislative activity con-
cerning OCS development subsequent to the enactment of the 
CZMA in 1972 undermined the majority's interpretation.214 
The dissent found nothing in the plain language of section 
307(c)(1) which distinguished between federal activity occurring 
inside or outside of the coastal zone,215 stating, "it is the effect of 
the activities, rather than their location, that is relevant."216 Since 
Congress' express purpose in passing the CZMA was to encourage 
federal-state cooperative long-range planning to protect the coas-
tal resources,217 it was necessary to subject federal activity occur-
ring outside of the coastal zone to consistency review under sec-
tion 307(c)(l).218 The conference committee replaced "in the coastal 
zone" with "directly affecting the coastal zone" in order to ensure 
that "if an activity outside the zone has the same kind of effect on 
206 Id. 
207 I d. at 672. 
208 Id. 
209 _ U.S. _, 104 S. Ct. at 672-89. 
2\0 I d. at 673-74. 
211 Id. at 674-78. 
212 Id. at 678-80. 
213 I d. at 680-83. 
214 Id. at 683-88. 
215 Id. at 673-74. 
216 Id. at 673. 
217 Id. at 673-74. 
218 Id. 
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the zone as an activity conducted in the zone it [would be] covered 
by section 307(c)(1)."219 
Reviewing the 1972 legislative history of the CZMA, Justice 
Stevens determined that the majority's conclusion that Congress 
had not demonstrated any concern for federal activities outside of 
the coastal zone was based on a misreading of the scope of the 
House and Senate bills.220 For example, sections 312 and 313 of the 
CZMA bill passed by the House specifically concerned activities 
occurring outside of the coastal zone.221 Section 312 permitted 
state coastal programs to establish marine sanctuaries extending 
into the OCS.222 Motions to delete or amend section 312 had been 
defeated on the House floor.223 Section 313 required the federal 
government to develop a management program for OCS activities 
that would ensure that they would be consistent with adjacent 
states' coastal programs.224 
Justice Stevens noted that the Senate was also concerned with 
federal activities occurring outside of the coastal zone.225 Coastal 
zone management legislation was debated in the Senate in 
1971,226 the year before the CZMA was finally enacted by Con-
gress.227 The 1971 Senate bill's federal consistency requirement 
provision, the forerunner of section 307(c)(1), was similar to sec-
tion 307(c)(1) of the CZMA as finally enacted in 1972. The 1971 
Senate Committee Report on this legislation extended the consis-
tency requirement to "any federal activity having a functional 
interrelationship from an economic, social, or geographical 
standpoint" with the coastal zone.228 Since the wording of the 
CZMA's section 307(c)(1) threshold requirement is similar to the 
1971 Senate bill's, and there is no indication in the 1972 CZMA 
legislative history that Congress had changed its intended mean-
219 Id. at 675-77. The dissent goes on to recognize that the decision to lease an OCS 
tract is the "only federal activity that ever occurs with respect to OCS oil and gas 
development." Id. at 680. Subsequent activities are conducted by the lessee petroleum 
companies. The dissent urged that the majority's interpretation, by exempting the 
federal leasing decision from the CZMA's consistency requirement, renders this part of 
the Act nugatory and thus ought to be rejected. Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 I d. at 676. 
223 Id. at 675-76. 
224 Id. at 675. 
225 I d. at 676-78. 
228 S. REP. 526, supra note 181. 
227 S. REP. 753, supra note 99. 
228 I d. at 20. 
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ing concerning the scope of this section, Justice Stevens argued 
that section 307(c)(1) should be interpreted in accordance with the 
1971 Senate Committee Report.229 
The dissenting opinion proceeded to explain why the two pro-
posals offered during the Senate debates, which would have ex-
tended provisions of the CZMA to the OCS, were defeated.230 The 
first proposal, which would have granted coastal state governors 
a veto over the issuance of leases off their coasts, was rejected 
because it granted the states too much authority and was pre-
sented without hearings and deliberation.231 The second proposal, 
authorizing a study of the environmental effects of Atlantic OCS 
drilling, was broadened to provide for the study of environmental 
effects of OCS drilling in general, and incorporated into the Senate 
bill.232 
Justice Stevens asserted that the conference committee substi-
tuted "directly affecting" for "in" the coastal zone in order to 
clarify the scope of section 307(c)(1).233 The House then agreed to 
drop sections 312 and 313 and the inclusion of federal lands in the 
definition of coastal zone. In return, federal activities which di-
rectly affected the coastal zone, whether occurring inside or out-
side of the coastal zone as then defined by the bill, became subject 
to consistency review under section 307(c)(1).234 
The dissent maintained that a broader construction of the scope 
of section 307(c)(1) better accomplished the purposes of the 
CZMA.235 Subjecting OCS lease sales to consistency review would 
ensure federal-state cooperation in the protection of the coastal 
zone.236 Early review would put concerned parties on notice as to 
any state objections to OCS development, thereby ensuring better 
planning.237 Moreover, if the lease sale, which is the only exclu-
sively federal activity in the OCS development process, was not 
subject to consistency review, section 307(c)(1) would be rendered 
meaningless.238 
229 104 8. Ct. at 676-77. 
230 [d. at 677-78 n.13. See also supra notes 175-76. 
231 [d. 
232 [d. See 8.3507 § 316(c), reprinted in 8. REP. 753, supra note 99. 
233 [d. at 678. 
234 [d. at 677. 
235 [d. at 678-80. 
236 [d. 
237 [d. 
236 [d. 
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Justice Stevens determined that Lease Sale 53 directly affected 
the coastal zone, reiterating the factual findings of the lower 
courtS.239 The Secretary of Interior's decision to lease, which in-
volved selecting tracts and formulating lease stipulations, was a 
crucial step in the OCS development process. It involved large 
sums of money and set in motion a series of events leading to 
development.240 The impacts of the sale were significant and oc-
curred immediately.241 Justice Stevens argued that if federal-state 
conflicts were not resolved at this early stage of the process, they 
would never be adequately resolved.242 
Justice Stevens then reviewed subsequent congressional ac-
tions dealing with OCS energy development.243 The CZMA was 
amended in 1976.244 At that time, Congress was concerned with 
the scope of section 307(c)(3), which outlines the consistency obli-
gations of private lessees of offshore tracts,245 and not with section 
307(c)(1),246 the federal consistency requirement.247 Justice Stevens 
presented evidence in the legislative history of the 1976 CZMA 
amendments showing that OCS leases were not made subject to 
consistency review under 307(c)(3) because Congress was con-
cerned with extending the consistency requirements, which Con-
gress assumed already applied to OCS leases, to the later stages of 
OCS development.248 Justice Stevens inferred that Congress' deci-
sion not to include the word lease in section 307(c)(3) was based on 
a desire not to alter the scope of that section. Nonetheless, the 
"central premise on which Congress legislated [in 1976 was] that 
section 307(c)(1) already applied to OCS oil and gas leasing deci-
sions."249 
The dissent then turned to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act Amendments of 1978,250 upon which the majority had placed 
so much reliance.251 The dissent maintained that Congress simply 
2:'" Id. at 680-83. 
240 I d. at 681-82. 
241 Id. 
242 I d. at 682-83. 
243 I d. at 683-88. 
244 Supra note 102. 
245 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (1982). 
24{\ 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982). 
247 104 S. Ct. at 685-86. 
248 I d. at 685. 
249 104 S. Ct. at 685. 
250 Pub. L. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1982) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1801-1866). 
251 See Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. at 668-71, 672. 
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did not intend these OCSLA amendments to affect the consis-
tency requirements of CZMA section 307(c)(1).252 In fact, the 
OCSLA amendments contained a savings clause253 specifically 
stating that the amendments were not to interfere with the con-
sistency requirements of the CZMA.254 Legislative history con-
struing this savings clause asserted that "ocs activities, includ-
ing lease sales ... must comply with 'consistency' requirements as 
to coastal zone management plans .... "255 Furthermore, section 
18(f) was also added to the OCSLA256 in 1978 expressly to require 
the Secretary of Interior to consider state coastal zone manage-
ment programs when developing the OCS leasing program.257 
Finally, the CZMA was reauthorized in 1980.258 The House259 
and Senate200 reports of the 1980 CZMA contained explicit lan-
guage which stated that OCS lease sales were subject to consis-
tency review under section 307(c)(1).261 Justice Stevens also noted 
that in 1981 NOAA attempted to alter CZMA regulations to 
exempt OCS lease sales from consistency review.262 The House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries promptly voted to 
exercise the legislative veto263 over the new regulations264 and 
NOAA withdrew the proposed change.265 The dissent cited these 
actions as demonstrating a continuous congressional commit-
ment to apply CZMA's consistency requirement to federal OCS 
lease sale decisions.266 
4. Critique of the Majority Opinion in Interior v. California 
The majority adopted a very narrow construction of "directly 
affecting," which confines consistency review under section 
252 Id. at 686-87. 
253 43 U.S.C. § 1866(a). 
254 Id. 
255 HOUSE REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 153 n.52, reprinted in 1!l78 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1.t50, 1559 n.52. See 104 S. Ct. at 686. 
256 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 
257 104 S. Ct. at 686-87. 
258 Pub. L. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060 (1980). 
259 H. REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4362, 4382. 
200 S. REP. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980) quoted in Interior V. California, 104 S. 
Ct. at 688. 
261 104 S. Ct. at 687-88. 
262 Id. at 688-89. See also infra note 361. 
263 See 16 U.S.C. § 1463a (1982). 
264 H.R. REP. No. 269, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1981). 
265 47 Fed. Reg. 4231 (1982). 
266 104 S. Ct. 687-89. 
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307(c)(1) to federal activities occurring inside the geographical 
limits of the coastal zone. This decision frustrates the purpose of 
the CZMA. It is not supported by the legislative history, the plain 
language, or NOAA's interpretations of the CZMA. The decision 
also misconstrues the relationship between the CZMA and the 
OCSLA. 
a. Legislative History 
The majority expressly refused to allow considerations of the 
CZMA's purpose or policy to affect its construction of the Act's 
threshold requirement of a "direct effect" on the coastal zone.267 
The majority viewed the problem as defining the statutory phrase 
"directly affecting." Ruling the competing interpretations ad-
vanced by California and Interior both "superficially plausible" 
but without support in the CZMA itself,268 the majority turned 
almost immediately to the Act's legislative history. The majority 
placed primary reliance on the legislative history of the CZMA in 
1972 to support its construction of "directly affecting" in section 
307(c)(1).269 The majority cited congressional rejection, during the 
enactment of the CZMA, of four proposals which would have 
extended the CZMA to the OCS, as evidence of Congress' inten-
tion that "directly affecting" be narrowly construed.270 These four 
proposals, however, were rwt rejected because of congressional 
opposition to extending CZMA requirements to OCS activities. In 
fact, they were deleted because of their own inherent defects. 
Section 313 of the original House bill allowed the Secretary of 
Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of Interior, to de-
velop a multi-purpose management plan for OCS areas adjacent 
to the coastal zone within twelve miles from shore.271 The plan 
was intended to complement state coastal programs.272 Activities 
occurring in the area immediately adjacent to state costal zones 
were to conform to the states' programs to "the maximum extent 
practicable."273 This requirement was designed to ensure that 
267 I d. at 672. 
268 I d. at 661. 
269 104 S. Ct. at 661-68. 
270 I d. at 663-66. 
271 H.R. 14146 § 313(a), supra note 99. 
272 H.R. REP. No. 1049, supra note 99. 
273 H.R. 14146 § 313(c), supra note 99. 
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OCS activities, especially oil and gas development, did not jeopar-
dize the state coastal programs.274 
Section 313 was rejected by the conference committee in 1972 
because "the provisions relating thereto did not prescribe 
sufficient standards or criteria and would create potential 
conflicts with legislation already in existence concerning OCS 
resources."275 This rejection indicated that Congress did not want 
to establish a new federal management program for OCS areas, 
particularly since no standards or criteria for such a program 
were set forth in the section. As thus drafted the proposal could 
have interfered with OCS energy development. 
Section 312 of the original House bill allowed states to establish 
estuarine sanctuaries in the coastal zone.276 The Seeretary of 
Commerce could then permit a state to extend its sanctuary into 
the OCS,277 but the Secretary would promulgate regulations for 
sanctuary extensions.278 This provision did not require federal 
activities occurring inside the sanctuary extension to be subject 
to consistency review. Nevertheless, congressmen expressed con-
cern that this section duplicated existing OCS programs279 and 
might foreclose OCS energy development without judicial or ad-
ministrative review.280 The conference committee deleted this 
proposed provision, saying that "the need for such a provision 
appears rather remote."28t 
The majority also relied on Congress' rejection of several pro-
posals raised during the Senate CZMA debates that would have 
expanded the scope of the Act. Senator Hale Boggs, expressing 
concern about offshore oil transport terminals, offered an 
amendment which would have granted coastal state governors a 
veto over the issuance of any OCS lease which affected the coastal 
zone.282 During the subsequent debate it was pointed out that the 
amendment would grant the state governors too much authority 
over OCS activities and was offered without public hearings or 
274 104 S. Ct. at 663-64, citing remarks of Congressman Anderson, 118 CONGo REC. 
26484, 26495, 35549-50 (1972). 
'" H. CONF. R. 1544, supra note 100, at 15. 
276 H.R. 14146 § 312, supra note 99. 
277 ld. § 312(b). 
278 ld. § 312(c). 
279 104 S. Ct. at 678 n.13, citing remarks of Congressman Kyl, 118 CoNG. REC. 26495-96 
(1972). 
280 ld., citing remarks of Congressman Clark, 118 CONGo REC. 26495 (1972). 
281 H. CONF. R. 1544, supra note 100, at 14-15. 
282 104 S. Ct. 665 n.14. 
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committee deliberation.28.3 Furthermore, the issue of offshore oil 
transport terminals was being considered by the Senate Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs.284 In light of this information, 
Senator Boggs withdrew his amendment.285 
The final proposal, also offered on the Senate floor, required 
"the National Academy of Science to undertake a full investiga-
tion of the environmental hazards attendant on offshore oil dril-
ling on the Atlantic OCS."286 Several senators objected to the 
proposal because of its narrow focus.287 However, when the provi-
sion was amended to provide for recommendations on the elimi-
nation of environmental hazards of OCS drilling in general the 
objection was withdrawn288 and the provision was incorporated 
into the Senate bill.289 The conference committee ultimately omit-
ted this proposal on the grounds that it was simply "non-
germane" to the CZMA.290 
An objective examination of the legislative activity regarding 
the four proposals cited by the majority indicates that each pro-
posal was rejected because of its own inherent defects. Their 
deletion does not demonstrate that federal OCS leasing decisions 
were excluded from consistency review under section 307(c)(1). 
Justice O'Connor apparently misconstrued the purposes of the 
rejected provisions and the reasons for their deletion. 
The more accurate explanation of congressional intent was put 
forward in the rationales of the dissenting and lower court opin-
ion. Congress explicitly announced, in section 303 of the Act, that 
the purpose of the CZMA was to establish a "national policy to 
preserve, protect, develop and where possible, to restore or en-
hance, the resources of the coastal zone."291 Congress realized that 
the "competing demands ... occasioned by population growth and 
economic development" were destroying the coastal environ-
ment.292 One of the circumstances leading to the CZMA's passage 
28.1 Id., citing remarks of Senators Hollings and Moss, 118 CONGo REC. 14184 (1972). 
2R4 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id., citing 118 CONGo REC. 14183 (1972). 
287 Id., citing remarks_of Senators Stevens and Moss, 118 CONGo REC. 14180-81 (1972). 
288 SENATE COMMITI'EE ON COMMERCE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CZMA OF 1972, 
AS AMENDED IN 1974 AND 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 283-86 (1976). 
289 S. 3507 § 316(c)(I), supra note 99. 
290 104 S. Ct. at 665 n.14, citing remarks of Congressman Downing, 118 CONGo REC. 
35547 (1972). 
291 16 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1982). 
292 16 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1982). 
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in 1972 was the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969,293 which was 
caused by a federally authorized offshore oil well.294 Furthermore, 
Congress determined that the various state and local authorities 
had proven incapable of comprehensively "planning and regulat-
ing land and water uses in the coastal zone."295 Congress decided 
that to protect the coastal zone it was necessary "to encourage 
the states to exercise their full authority over the lands and 
waters in the coastal zone."296 
Congress decided in 1972 that the best management of coastal 
resources would be achieved if states were given the major role in 
developing and administering coastal programs. The CZMA was 
thus designed to encourage and assist the states to assume com-
prehensive planning and regulatory functions over the coastal 
zone. It sought to accomplish this in two ways. First, it provided 
grants-in-aid to coastal states to develop and implement coastal 
zone management programs.297 Second, it dictated that federal 
activities which affected the coastal zone should be conducted in a 
manner consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with the 
state coastal zone management program.298 
Preventing the states from participating in the crucial early 
planning stages of OCS energy development defeats the purpose 
and design of the CZMA. It seems impossible to protect the 
natural systems of the coastal zone adequately without consider-
ing activities in the OCS seaward of the coastal zone. As Rep-
resentative Anderson of California remarked, "[O]il spills do not 
respect legal jurisdictional lines.m99 Restricting the state role in 
the OCS leasing and development process might also discourage 
states from participating in the federal coastal zone management 
program. 
Congress clearly recognized the need to extend provisions of the 
CZMA to OCS activities. This was manifested in sections 312 and 
313 of the original House bill. The Senate was also concerned with 
extending consistency review to activities occurring outside of the 
coastal zone. The consistency language in the 1972 Senate bill was 
293 Gulf Oil v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1973). _ 
294 118 CONGo REC. 26484 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Anderson). See also 104 S. Ct. at 
663-64. 
295 16 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1982). 
296 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1982). 
297 16 U.S.C. § 1454, 1455 (1982). 
298 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(I) (1982). 
2"" 118 CONGo REC., supra note 294, at 26484. 
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identical to that in the CZMA bill of the previous year. The Report 
on the 1971 bill had construed this language to extend the consis-
tency requirement to any federal activity having "a functional 
interrelationship from an economic, social or geographic 
standpoint" with the coastal zone.300 There is nothing in the 1972 
Senate report to contradict this language, so it can be assumed 
that this language aptly describes the scope of section 307(c)(1). 
Given the explicit purposes of the CZMA and the express intent 
of Congress to subject activities occurring outside of the coastal 
zone to consistency review, the conference committee's substitu-
tion of "directly affecting" for "in" the coastal zone can only be 
construed as expanding the scope of section 307(c)(1). As a result, 
federal activities which have an impact on the coastal zone, 
whether occurring inside or outside of the coastal zone, were 
intended by Congress to be subject to consistency review under 
section 307(c)(1). 
Congressional actions following the enactment of the CZMA 
lend further support to this position. In 1976 Congress enacted 
amendments to the CZMA301 in order to deal with the impact of 
OCS energy development.302 The amendments contained two 
major revisions. First, the Coastal Energy Impact Program was 
established to provide financial assistance to states and local 
communities to deal with the effects of OCS energy develop-
ment.303 Second, section 307(c)(3) was modified. Its original lan-
guage was retained as section 307(c)(3)(A) and a new provision, 
section 307(c)(3)(B), was added. The new subsection granted the 
affected coastal states the right to review exploration, develop-
ment and production plans for each OCS tract in order to ensure 
that the particular development plans do not interfere with the 
state's coastal zone management process.304 This new section was 
designed to expedite OCS energy development.305 
The majority in Interior v. California distorted the intent of 
Congress regarding OCS leasing in the 1976 amendments. While 
300 S. REP. No. 526, supra note 181, at 20. See also 104 S. Ct. at 676 n.10, II. 
301 CZMA Amendments of 1976, supra note 102. 
3112 16 U.S.C. § 145l(i) (1982). 
303 16 U.S.C. § 1456a (1982). 
304 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982). 
305 H.R. REP. No. 1298, supra note 196, at 30-31. The new section provides that once a 
lessee's plan is certified as being consistent with a state's coastal zone management 
program, the issuance of all subsequent federal licenses and permits during that phase 
of the process are presumed to be consistent with the state's program. This eliminates 
the consistency requirement for each license and permit. 
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Congress ultimately decided not to include the words lease in 
section 307(c)(3)(B),306 both the initial 1976 House and Senate bills 
confirmed that OCS leasing was already subject to consistency 
review.307 Throughout the debates congressmen stated that the 
proposed inclusion of the word lease was merely a reaffirmation of 
the original intent of Congress to subject OCS lease sales to 
consistency review.308 In addition, leasing was deleted from the 
1976 bill in the House not because of opposition to the concept, but 
merely in order to give Congress more time to consider the issue 
during the conference committee deliberations.309 
The conference committee's exclusion of leasing from section 
307(c)(3) was not meant to preclude consistency review of OCS 
lease sales under section 307(c)(1). Any comments made during 
the conference committee's deliberation implying this310 are 
306 122 CONGo REC. 6128 (1976). 
307 S. 586, H.R. 3981, supra note 103. 
308 104 S. Ct. at 684 n.25. 
309 Supra note 104. Representative DuPont, sponsor of the amendment, stated: 
By striking it in the House bill and leaving it in the bill that has already passed 
the Senate we will be giving ourselves a little bit of flexibility in the conference 
to either adopt the language as the Senate put it in or adopt some other 
language we feel would be more beneficial and at the same time protect the 
rights of the States. So the purpose of this amendment is not to get rid of the 
word 'lease,' but to allow us time to work on the problem a little bit longer. 
310 The following discussion took place in the conference committee between Represen-
tative Breaux and Congressional staff members: 
Mr. Breaux: It is your interpretation we are extending that [consistency re-
quirement of section 307(c)(3) of the CZMA] to leases? 
Mrs. Baldwin [Senate Staff]: We are extending it to development plans. 
Mr. Hussey [Senate Staff]: This typically excludes leases. 
Mr. Breaux: I don't want to take up the committee's time, but what happens if a 
state says no to an exploration plan? What happens to the lease somebody 
bought and paid for? 
Mrs. Baldwin: Nothing would happen to the lease. It would have to be modified 
as any other provision would have to be. 
Mr. Kitsos [House staff]: The Secretary of Commerce can declare in the interest 
of national security [that] consistency is assumed. He can override the state in 
that process. 
Mr. Hussey: Of course, you realize the states have to get an approved section 306 
program prior to the specific provision taking place. 
Mr. Breaux: It is clearly the intent that it doesn't extend to leases. 
Mrs. Baldwin: Only to activity covered in the plans. 
Conference Committee Transcript of May 17, 1976, at 29. Furthermore, one of the staff 
members of the conference committee stated: 
The Administration, ... does not have serious concerns about applying that 
provision to leases because of the potential for delay in the leasing process. Also, 
most of the states wouldn't be able to take advantage of it at that time because 
they won't have approved coastal zone management programs at the time of the 
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explicitly contradicted by a statement in the committee's report.3ll 
The 1976 conference committee report states that "the conference 
substitute follows the Senate bill" which "required that each 
Federal lease [for example, offshore oil and gas leases] had to be 
submitted to each state with an approved coastal zone manage-
ment program for" a consistency determination.312 
Even though OCS lease sales were not subject to consistency 
review under revised section 307(c)(3), this does not affect the 
consistency requirements imposed by section 307(c)(1).313 Congress 
expressed no intention in 1976 to repeal section 307(c)(1) by enact-
ing section 307(c)(3)(B), nor is there any "positive repugnancy" 
between the two provisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court 
should have given effect to both provisions in Interior v. Califor-
nia.314 
lease sale. In light of this, and in light of the suggestion from the Department of 
the Interior, the staff is suggesting that the conferees consider making it 
available at the plan approval stage. This is the process that takes place after an 
oil field is discovered and when a lessee is applying for approval of its plan to 
develop that. 
Transcript at 21-22. This testimony is cited in Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and 
Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract Selections and Lease Stipulations be Consistent with 
State Coastal Zone Management Programs?, 14 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 105, 115 n.42; 
Note, Consistency Provisions to OCS Leasing, 2 STAN. ENVTL. L. ANN. 144, 162-63. 
"" Deller, supra note 310, at 116 n.47, citing AM. JUR. 2D STATUTES 173; Note, supra 
note 310, at 163 n.91, citing U.S. v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Ry. Co., 247 U.S. 
310, 318 (1918); S.E. Contractors v. U.S., 406 U.S. 13 n.9 (1972). 
"12 H.R. REP. No. 1298, supra note 196, at 30. 
31a 104 S. Ct. at 685 n.28, citing a comment made by Congressman Studds, one of the 
sponsors of the CZMA Amendments in 1976, who stated: 
Nowhere in this entire set of deliberations [in 1976], was there any explicit or 
implicit reference to consistency decisions by [Interior] in its pre-lease activity 
pursuant to § 307(c)(1). The focus was on the proper time for the state to certify a 
private company's activity-not on the federal agency's obligations under § 
307(c)(1). 
The deletion of lease from § 307(c)(3) ... had absolutely no reference to the 
range of pre-leasing decisions made by the Interior Department and no implica-
tion is warranted with respect to the § 307(c)(1) issue here. 
H.R. REP. No. 269, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
3\4 The doctrine of repeal by implication has been consistently disfavored by the 
Supreme Court, as the 1979 opinion of the Justice Department, supra note 41, recognized. 
Since OCS leasing was already covered by section 307(c)(1), it might be presumed that 
the conference committee decided to delete the word lease from the 1976 Amendments' 
version of this section to avoid risking a presidential veto of the Amendments. Senator 
Tunney, one of the Senate sponsors of the 1976 Amendments, noted the conference 
committee "compromised on this issue due to a threat of a presidential veto of the entire 
bill." 122 CONGo REe. 10941 (1976). Furthermore, only section 307(c)(3) was being consid-
ered for revision. Section 307(c)(3) was designed to expedite OCS development, and deals 
primarily with the post-sale activities of lessees. The conference committee may have 
decided not to alter the focus of307(c)(3) by adding the word lease. See 104 S. Ct. at 685-86. 
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A 1977 study by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)315 
concluded that any confusion over CZMA consistency provisions 
stems from the fact that the CZMA embodied two different con-
sistency standards.316 The first standard, set forth in section 
307( c)(1), was the weaker of the two and applied to OCS lease 
sales.317 The second standard, set forth in section 307(c)(3), was 
more stringent and applied to OCS post-lease permits, not to OCS 
lease sales.3lB The OTA's observation is significant because it rec-
ognized that OCS lease sales were subject to consistency review 
under section 307(c)(1). 
The CZMA was reauthorized in 1980.319 The committee reports 
of that year explicitly state that section 307(c)(1) applies to OCS 
lease sales.320 The majority briefly recognized these comments in a 
footnote, but ruled that the comments were "of little help in 
construing the intent behind the law actually enacted."321 
In sum Justice O'Connor disregarded strong congressional lan-
guage clearly indicating that Congress intended OCS leasing to be 
subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(l). The 1980 
Senate report explained that "Interior's activities which precede 
the OCS lease sales were to remain subject to the requirements of 
section 307(c)(1)."322 The House report of that year asserted that 
the 1976 CZMA amendments "did not alter Federal agency re-
sponsibility to provide states with a consistency determination 
related to OCS decision which preceded the issuance of leases."323 
The House report went on to state that consistency review under 
section 307(c)(1) was mandated "whenever Federal activity had a 
functional interrelationship from an economic, geographic or so-
cial standpoint with a State's coastal program's land and water 
use policy."324 Alternatively, federal consistency review applied 
315 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT, A 
STUDY FOR THE AD Hoc SELECT COMMI'ITEE ON OCS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
316 [d. at 155-57. 
317 [d. at 155. Section 307(c)(1) requires the federal government to determine that its 
activities are consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with a state's coastal 
program. 
31B [d. at 156. Section 307(c)(3)(B) requires state certification that a lessee's plans are 
consistent with the state's coastal program. 16 U.S.C. § l456(c)(3)(B) (1982). 
319 CZMA Improvement Act, supra note 108. 
320 S. REP. No. 783, H.R. Rep. 1012, supra note 109. 
321 104 S. Ct. at 666 n.15. 
322 S. REP. No. 783, supra note 109, at 11. 
323 H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 109, at 28. 
324 [d. 
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"when a Federal agency initiates a series of events of coastal 
management consequence."325 
While such statements are not conclusive, they do represent 
congressional interpretation of the CZMA and should have been 
afforded proper respect by the Court in Interior v. California.326 
Instead, the majority ignored this crucial data in its statutory 
interpretation. The Supreme Court should have adopted the logic 
of the Ninth Circuit, which held that, "[i]n the circumstances of 
this case we accord them [committee statements] substantial 
weight because they appear to us to serve better the purposes of 
the CZMA than would the narrower interpretation urged by the 
Federal appellants."327 
b. The Administrative Interpretation Of "Directly Affecting:" 
National Atmospheric And Oceanic Administration 
Regulations 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the CZMA's threshold 
requirement in Interior v. California was contrary to NOAA regu-
lations implementing the Act. Considerable deference is tradi-
tionally given to agency expertise.328 Since NOAA's regulations 
are not arbitrary or capricious, the Supreme Court should have 
followed them in Interior v. Califmnia.329 Instead, the Supreme 
Court dismissed NOAA's regulations in a footnote, on the grounds 
that "in construing section 307(c)(1) the Agency has walked a path 
of such tortured vacillation and indecision that no help is to be 
gained in that quarter."330 An objective review of NOAA regula-
tions on the CZMA's threshold requirement of a direct effect on 
the coastal zone does not support the Supreme Court's conclusion. 
When the amendments to the CZMA were enacted in 1976, only 
one state, Washington, had an approved coastal management 
325 Id. 
32" 104 S. Ct. at 688 n.36. See also 683 F.2d at 1262. See generally Linsley, supra note 21, 
at 460-61. 
327 683 F.2d at 1262. 
32" Id. at 1263. The Ninth Circuit held that a court generally defers to agency regula-
tions if the regulations "implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable 
manner." 683 F.2d at 1263. As the district court held, "[iJt is the settled principle that an 
agency interpretation of a statute is normally entitled to deference from the courts." 520 
F.Supp. at 1276-77. See also American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 
903-08 (C.D. Cal. 1978), 609 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1979). 
329 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
330 104 S. Ct. at 661 n.6. 
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program.:l:Jl When NOAA proposed the first federal consistency 
regulations in that year':~12 the Agency recognized that the Fed-
eral agency and "the state/local government community" had 
different perspectives on the issue.:l:J:l The proposed regulations 
gave federal agencies authority to conduct consisteney determi-
nations under section 307(c)(1) and (2)?14 but they did not define 
"directly affecting." Instead, NOAA took the position that the 
regulations would "adopt the 'causal' terms of the Act."':335 Federal 
activities would have to be evaluated on a factual case-by-case 
basis to determine if they directly affected the coastal zone.:l36 
In 1977, responding to a request to clarify the meaning of the 
statutory language, NOAA amended its proposed regulations.:3:l7 
The new proposed regulations defined individual threshold tests 
to identify activities requiring consistency review.:l:l8 NOAA ex-
plained that "directly affecting" should be defined "in terms of the 
significance of the effects on the coastal zone."3:l9 
In the 1977 proposed regulations, NOAA also addressed the 
specific issue of whether OCS lease sales were subject to CZMA 
consistency determinations. NOAA announced that it was "con-
sidering a position which treated the DOl's pre-lease sale deci-
sions, as federal activities subject to the requirements of section 
:):ll 41 Fed. Reg. 42879 (1976). 
:w Id. at 42878. 
:",:l Iii. at 42879. 
'1'14 Id. 
:l:l.' ld. at 42880. 
""Ii lei. 
'I'll 42 Fed. Reg. 43586 (1977). 
"'" leZ. at 43588. The different federal activities subject to consistency review under 
section 307(c) have different threshold requirements: sections 307(c)(1) and (2) apply to 
direct federal activities including development projects, and the threshold test is "di-
rectly affecting the coastal zone;" section 307(c)(3)(A) applies to federally licensed and 
permitted activities, and the threshold test is "affecting land or water uses in the coastal 
zone;" section 307(c)(3)(B) applies to federally licensed and permitted activities described 
in OCS plans, and the threshold test is "affecting any land or water use in the coastal 
zone;" and section 307(d) applies to federal assistance to state and local governments, 
and the threshold test is "affecting the coastal zone." 
:<lO Id. at 43590. NOAA noted that it was impossible to develop a precise definition for 
"directly affecting." However, the term could be defined by analogy. NOAA examined 
the definition of the coastal zone which held that "shorelands" were to be considered 
part of the coastal zone, if their use had a "direct impact" on coastal waters. Direct 
impacts were defined as "only those impacts of a significant nature." NOAA thus 
equated significant with direct. NOAA then turned to CEQ regulations to define "di-
rectly affecting" which NOAA equated with the "significantly affecting" test of NEPA, 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
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307(c)(1)."340 However, citing uncertainty regarding congressional 
intent on the matter and Interior's strong opposition to the posi-
tion, NOAA decided not to adopt a firm stance on the issue.341 
In 1978 the final CZMA regulations regarding federal consis-
tency were issued.342 The regulations adopted a single liberal in-
terpretation of all of the threshold tests set forth in the five 
subsections of section 307(c), including 307(c)(1), triggering consis-
tency review. All federal activities which "significantly affected" 
the coastal zone would be subject to consistency review.343 The 
term "significantly" was broadly defined.344 This "significantly 
affecting" test was modeled345 on the threshold test in NEPA.346 In 
effect, the "significantly affecting" test of the regulations replaced 
the "directly affecting" test of subsection 307(c)(1). 
Despite the expansion of the "directly affecting" test, OCS lease 
sales were exempt from consistency review under the 1978 regu-
lations.347 NOAA explained that it had received conflicting com-
ments from the oil industry and the states regarding the question 
whether OCS lease sales should be considered "Federal licenses or 
permits" subject to CZMA consistency rules.348 NOAA further 
realized that the controversy between Interior and the Depart-
ment of Commerce over the applicability of section 307(c)(1) to 
federal OCS lease sales had not been resolved. NOAA, unwilling 
340 [d. at 43591. 
341 [d. at 43592. 
342 43 Fed. Reg. 10510 (1978). 
343 [d. at 10511. NOAA explained that uniformity among the threshold tests was jus-
tified, on the grounds that the legislative history was "replete" with statements that 
Congress intended to include all federal activities capable of significantly affecting the 
coastal zone. Furthermore, the terms were "interchangeable and synonymous." 
344 [d. at 10519. The regulations directed that a federal activity was subject to consis-
tency review if it caused significant: (1) changes in the manner in which land, water, or 
other coastal zone resources are used; (2) limitations on the range of uses of coastal zone 
natural resources; or (3) changes in the quality of coastal zone natural resources. 
Furthermore, the regulations provided that: 
The significance of the changes or limitations caused by Federal action must be 
considered in terms of the primary, secondary, and cumulative effects on the 
coastal zone. A Federal action which causes significant changes in or limitation 
on the coastal zone natural resources meets the requirements of this section 
even when the action causes both beneficial and adverse coastal zone effects 
and, on balance, the effects are determined to be beneficial. 
345 42 Fed. Reg. 43590 (1977). 
346 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (1982). 
347 43 Fed. Reg. 10519, 10513 (1978). 
348 [d. at 10513. 
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to make a controversial decision on the issue, simply deferred 
issuing its judgment.349 
The Department of Justice opinion on CZMA's applicability to 
federal OCS pre-lease activities, issued on April 20, 1979 during 
the controversy over Lease Sale 48, had a major impact on 
NOAA's regulations.350 The Justice Department ruled that OCS 
pre-leasing activities were generally subject to consistency re-
view, if such activities did, in fact, directly affect the coastal 
zone.35! The Department of Justice maintained that 307(c)(l)'s 
requirement of a direct effect on the coastal zone was a factual 
standard to be applied to OCS lease sales on a case-by-case 
basis.352 
At the same time, the Justice Department rejected NOAA's 
substitution of the "significantly affecting" test for the statutory 
"directly affecting" test in section 307(c)(1).353 The Justice Depart-
ment determined that Congress had intended that different 
threshold requirements should be applied to the different ac-
tivities that were subject to consistency review under the five 
subsections of section 307(c).354 Consequently, the "directly affect-
ing" requirement of section 307(c)(1) ought not be lowered to a 
"significantly affecting" standard.355 
In response to the Justice Department's opinion, NOAA issued 
revised regulations.356 The new regulations established individual 
threshold tests for the activities subject to consistency review 
under section 307(c). The "directly affecting" test was reinstated 
for the implementation of section 307(c)(1). The phrase "directly 
affecting" itself remained undefined.357 
Although "directly affecting" was not given a definition, the 
new regulations did dictate that OCS pre-leasing activities were 
subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1).358 NOAA also 
349 Id. at 10512. 
350 DOJ Opinion, supra note 41. 
351 Id. at 13-14. 
3" Id. at 14. 
353 Id. at 13-14. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. 
356 44 Fed. Reg. 37142 (1979). 
357 Id. 
358 The regulations (15 C.F.R. § 930.71) excluded OCS lease sales from the definition of 
"Federal licenses or permits." 44 Fed. Reg. at 37154. However, OCS activities were 
subject to review under section 930.33(c) which stated that, "[f]ederal activities outside 
the coastal zone (e.g. on excluded Federal land, or OCS, or landward of the coastal zone) 
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encouraged federal agencies to "construe liberally the 'directly 
affecting' test in borderline cases so as to favor the inclusion of 
Federal activities subject to consistency review."359 In 1980 NOAA 
reiterated its position that OCS lease sales were subject to consis-
tency review.360 
The NOAA's interpretation of section 307(c)(1) shows the agen-
cy's awareness that the CZMA's applicability to OCS energy de-
velopment was highly controversial. Nevertheless, NOAA regula-
tions have never in any sense been arbitrary or capricious. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court ought to have given the adminis-
trative interpretation of the phrase "directly affecting" more 
weight in Interior v. California. 
From the time when it first proposed CZMA regulations in 1976, 
until 1981, when California v. Watt was initiated,361 NOAA consis-
tently maintained that section 307(c)(1)'s "direct effect" threshold 
requirement be liberally construed. In fact, the agency briefly 
are subject to Federal agency review to determine whether they directly affect the 
coastal zone." 44 Fed. Reg. at 37146, 
359 Id. at 37146-47. 
36Q Letter from NOAA to State Coastal Management Program Directors (Apr. 9, 1980), 
cited at 683 F.2d at 1262, which reads: "In our view, Federal consistency requirements 
subject the final notice of [an] OCS sale to consistency determinations. This critical 
decision point in the OCS process influences tracts to be selected and stipulations to be 
imposed and thus sets in motion actions which will invariably affect coastal resources." 
36.1 In May 1981, two weeks after the complaints were filed in California v, Watt, the 
NOAA issued a notice of Proposed Rule-Making in which the Agency announced it was 
adopting Interior's narrow interpretation of "directly affecting." 46 Fed. Reg. 26658 
(1981). The proposed regulation directed that federal activity directly affected the coastal 
zone under the CZMA only if "the conduct of the activity itself produces a measurable 
physical alteration in the coastal zone or [if] that activity initiates a chain of events 
reasonably certain to result in such alteration, without further required agency ap-
proval." 46 Fed. Reg. 26659 (1981). In its comments to the proposed reguilltion, NOAA 
said that OCS planning decisions were not the type of activities which would directly 
a.ffect the coastal zone. Id. at 26660. The rule was issued in final form on July 8, 1981. 46 
Fed. Reg. 35253 (1981). 
The Agency's changed position evoked an immediate negative reaction from the states 
and Congress. The state of California brought suit against the Commerce Department 
(NOAA's parent agency); Alaska and Massachusetts intervened in the suit in support oJ 
California's position. State of California v. Baldridge, Civ. No. 81-3760 (filed Sept. 14, 1981) 
dismissed as moot, 12 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 711 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 1981). 
Resolutions disapproving the new regulation were introduced in both houses of Con-
gress, 12 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 522 (Aug. 21, 1981); 12 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 609 (Sept. 18, 
1981), and the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries voted to veto the 
regulations, H. Rep. No. 269, supra note 264. This congressional veto became part of the 
CZMA Amendments of 1980, see H. REP. No. 1012, supra note 109, at 53-54. 
The NOAA withdrew the regulation. 46 Fed. Reg. 50976 (1981); see also 47 Fed. Reg. 
4231 (1982). See supra text and notes at notes 262-66. 
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directed that federal agencies use a less stringent threshold test, 
the "significant effect" standard of NEPA, to determine whether 
a federal activity should be consistent with a state coastal man-
agement program under the CZMA. The NOAA's liberal con-
struction of section 307(c)(1) was faithful to the explicit purposes 
and policy of the CZMA, and the agency's regulations should have 
been given the weight due them according to precedent in Inter-
ior v. California. 
C. 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments 
The final element of the Supreme Court's rationale in Interior v. 
California concerned the relationship between the CZMA and the 
OCSLA.362 The OCSLA, originally enacted in 1953, gives the fed-
eral government jurisdiction over the OCS.363 The OCSLA 
Amendments of 1975364 established a strong national policy to 
develop the energy resources of the OCS. In Interior v. California 
the Court ruled that under the scheme established by the 1978 
legislation a federal OCS lease sale could not directly affect the 
coastal zone.365 However, the Court's opinion is not only based on 
an inaccurate portrayal of the consequences of an OCS lease sale, 
but also misinterprets the relationship Congress fashioned be-
tween the OCSLA and the CZMA in its 1978 legislation. 
The OCSLA Amendments of 1978 set up the mechanics of OCS 
energy development by delineating four distinct stages: (1) the 
preparation of a five-year lease program;366 (2) the lease sale;367 
(3)exploration;368 (4) development and production.369 The majority 
in Interior v. California held in essence that during the first two 
stages of OCS energy development there was by definition no 
federal activity which directly affected the coastal zone within the 
terms of the CZMA.370 
Viewing the federal lease sale narrowly, the majority deter-
mined that the lease sale only entitles the lessee to priority in the 
362 See supra text and notes at notes 198-208. 
363 See supra text and notes at notes 1-4. 
364 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 
365 See 104 S. Ct. at 668-72. 
366 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). 
367 [d. at § 1337(a). 
368 [d. at § 1340. 
369 [d. at § 1351. 
370 104 S. Ct. at 669-71. 
. - ---- -- --- - ---- - --- - -
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submission of subsequent exploration and development plans.371 If 
these plans are ultimately rejected by Interior, no further devel-
opment will take place. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the 
lease sale did not directly affect the coastal zone since it au-
thorized no activity that could have a physical impact on the 
coastal zone.372 
The Court's decision of Interior v. California understates the 
true significance of the federal OCS lease sale. The OCSLA de-
fines a "lease" as "any form of authorization which ... authorizes 
exploration for, and development and production of, minerals."373 
This definition assumes subsequent development. The lease sale 
establishes the parameters of energy development by identifying 
the tracts to be developed and the stipulations governing such 
development. It is the only time each multi-phased energy devel-
opment project is evaluated in its entirety, and the only stage 
when the cumulative effect of offshore oil and gas development on 
state coastal resources is considered. Furthermore, the high bid-
ding among petroleum companies for the leases belies the ma-
jority's characterization of the lease sale as mere priority posi-
tioning for the submission of subsequent plans.374 
The majority conceded that the lessee's activity during the 
exploration, development and production stages would have a 
direct effect on the coastal zone and that the requisite federal 
permits would be issued only after consistency review under sec-
tion 307(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA.375 However, the Court ruled the 
statutory scheme dictated that no activity prior to the final two 
stages would be subject to the CZMA's consistency requirement. 
Justice O'Connor asserted that the planning and development 
stages had been separated by Congress "to forestall premature 
litigation regarding adverse environmental effects" that would 
occur only at the later stages of the process.376 
The majority approach disregards both the 1979 Justice De-
partment opinion as well as the two lower court decisions in the 
case on this issue. The Justice Department found that whether or 
not an OCS lease sale directly affected the coastal zone was a 
371 I d. at 670. 
372 Id. at 670-71. 
373 43 U.S.C. § 1331(c) (1982). 
374 The highest bid made on a single tract in Lease Sale 53 was $333,600,000, submitted 
by Chevron Oil and Phillips Petroleum. This tract was not involved in the case. 
375 104 S. Ct. at 670-71. 
376 I d. at 671. 
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factual question to be answered on a case by case basis.371 The 
district court's factual determination in California v. Watt that 
Lease Sale 53 did directly affect California's coastal zone was 
affirmed by the Ninth Circut.378 Justice O'Connor simply ignored 
the direct effects of OCS pre-lease activities on the coastal zone. 
The majority asserted379 that nothing in its analysis of section 
307(c)(1) was inconsistent with the savings clause in the OCSLA 
Amendments which states that, "nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to amend, modify or repeal any provision of the 
CZMA."380 However, Justice O'Connor's conclusion on this point is 
erroneous. OCSLA's savings clause expressly states that th~ 1978 
OCSLA Amendments are not meant to override the provisions of 
the CZMA,381 but this is precisely what the majority's interpreta-
tion accomplishes. Furthermore, the section of the House report 
explaining this savings clause indicates that Congress assumed 
the CZMA consistency review applied to federal OCS lease sales. 
The report states, "[t]he committee is aware that in the CZMA of 
1972, as amended in 1976 ... certain OCS activities including OCS 
lease sales ... must comply with 'consistency' requirements as to 
coastal zone management programs."382 
D. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the CZMA's threshold 
requirement of a "direct effect" on the coastal zone in Interior v. 
California is incorrect. The decision diminishes state input at the 
crucial early stages of the OCS development process. This rele-
gates the states to a minor advisory role during the pre-lease and 
lease sale stages. These stages are the only points in the OCS 
energy development process at which the lease sale in its entirety 
can be evaluated to determine if it interferes with state coastal 
zone management programs. Later review is restricted to par-
ticular tracts under section 307(c)(3)(B). Consequently, limiting 
state involvement at the lease sale stage frustrates the purpose of 
the CZMA, which is to establish a cooperative management 
377 DOJ Opinion, supra note 41, at 10-11. 
378 520 F. Supp. at 1380-82; 683 F.2d at 1260. See 104 S. Ct. at 680-82. 
379 104 S. Ct. at 671 n.21. 
380 43 U.S.C. § 1866(a) (1982). 
381 ld. 
382 H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 n.52 (1977). 
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scheme between the federal and state governments to protect the 
natural systems of the coastal zone. 
The majority misreads the legislative history of the CZMA to 
come to a conclusion contrary to the Justice Department's 1979 
interpretation, NOAA regulations, and the district and appellate 
court opinions in the case. The decision fundamentally under-
states the importance of the lease sale and misconstrues the 
relationship between the OCSLA and the CZMA. 
The Court's opinion interprets the CZMA's threshold require-
ment in a manner contrary to the purpose and policy embodied in 
the CZMA. The CZMA was enacted to promote effective state 
protection of coastal resources; Interior v. California is a defeat 
for states' rights. It would be in the public interest to insure that 
OCS oil and gas development is consistent with state coastal plans 
at the lease sale stage. This would not only improve long-range 
planning but also enhance federal-state cooperation. 
State involvement in OCS energy development at the lease sale 
stage would allow a state to scrutinize Interior's leasing proposal 
to determine that the proposal did not conflict with the state's 
coastal zone management program. This would give the state a 
better opportunity to negotiate with Interior regarding both the 
location of development and the conditions under which such 
development would occur. In turn, the process would insure a 
better balancing of both federal and state interests, as well as 
energy and environmental concerns. 
Granting the states a more expansive role at the lease sale 
stage would also provide the states with a better opportunity to 
resolve the conflicts among local interests affected by OCS devel-
opment, such as the fishing industry, petroleum companies, envi-
ronmental groups, and local communities. This could diminish the 
time-consuming litigation which has plagued OCS development.38.3 
State involvement at the lease sale stage would also minimize 
the risk of monetary loss to petroleum companies and the federal 
government.384 Should a state object to a company's exploration or 
development and production plans, the company might not be 
383 E.g., NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 
813 (5th Cir. 1975); California v. Morton, 404 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1975); North Slope 
Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Suffolk County v. Secretary of Interior, 
562 F.2d 1368 (lst Cir. 1977); Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712 (1st 
Cir. 1979). 
384 See Deller, supra note 310, at 122. 
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able to realize a return on its massive investment. Early state 
participation in the process would put the companies on notice of 
state objections. The companies could then determine if bidding 
on certain tracts would be worthwhile. 
Furthermore, if the federal government later revokes a lease 
because of a state's denial of the lessee's consistency certification, 
the federal government must return the lease payments, as well 
as interest on the money.385 Since this would involve a massive 
drain on the Treasury, the federal government would be placed in 
the awkward position of having to put pressure on the state to 
alter its determination. Alternatively, the Secretary of Commerce 
could override the state's determination if he finds that the plans 
are in fact consistent with the state's coastal zone management 
program or essential for national security.386 
Finally, a ruling that consistency determinations were required 
for OCS lease sales would not delay OCS energy development.387 
Interior, not the state, would initially decide whether proposed 
lease sales are consistent with state coastal zone management 
programs.388 The demonstration of consistency should not pose 
any difficulty for Interior.389 Furthermore, if a state objects to 
Interior's findings, the Secretary of Commerce could be called 
upon to mediate the dispute.390 If the mediation fails, the state 
would have to adjudicate the conflict. In court, the state would 
have to demonstrate that the Secretary of Interior abused his 
discretion,391 acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner,392 or 
insufficiently articulated the reasons for his findings.393 
'f"> 43 U.S.C. § 1334(5)(a) (1982). See Union Oil v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975). 
aH6 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1982). 
387 S. REP. No. 783, supra note 109, at 10; Deller, supra note 310, at 12~~-23; California 
Brief, supra note 150, at 26-29. 
388 15 C.F.R. 930.34 (1984). 
389 In order for a state Coastal Zone Management Program to get federal approval 
under the CZMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1454(h), the NOAA must determine that the program 
considers "the national interest in both coastal protection and energy development" as 
well as "the views of the Federal agencies principally affected." Accordingly, Interior 
would not have to reconsider these issues when preparing an OCS lease sale consistency 
determination. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452(2)(A),(B), 1455(c)(8), 1456 (1982). 
:190 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h). 
391 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (1982). 
392 Id. See also Greenburg, Federal Consistency Under the CZMA: An Emerging Focus 
of Environmental Controversy in the 1980's, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 50001 
(1981). 
393 Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (1983). 
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Interior v. California rests on dubious grounds and frustrates 
the purposes of the CZMA. Federal OCS lease sale decisions 
should be subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1). 
This would facilitate long-range planning, improve federal-state 
relations, and strengthen the states ability to manage and protect 
the coastal zone. Early state participation in the OCS develop-
ment process would prevent delays at later stages of the process 
which could have major negative consequences for the federal 
government and the petroleum companies. Consequently, OCS 
lease sales should be subject to CZMA consistency review in order 
to improve and facilitate OCS energy development. 
IV. POSTSCRIPT: CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO INTERIOR V. 
CALIFORNIA 
Congress quickly reacted to the Supreme Court's narrow in-
terpretation of section 307(c)(1) in Interior v. California. Bills de-
signed to reverse the Court's decision:394 were introduced in both 
houses. In the House of Representatives, the Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Subcommittee on Oceanography reported a bill to 
the full committee on May 3, 1984.395 On June 13, 1984 the Senate 
Commerce Committee issued a favorable report on a bill which 
revised section 307(c)(1) in several ways.:396 
First, in order to clarify congressional intent, the Senate bill 
substituted the words "significantly affecting" for "directly affect-
"94 H.R. 4589, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2324, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Both bills 
stated that "Federal activity shall be treated as one that 'directly affects the coastal 
zone' if the conduct or support of the activity either (1) produces identifiable physical 
biological, social, or economic consequences on coastal zone, or (2) initiates a chain of 
events likely to result in any of such consequences. 
395 The House bill was similar to the Senate bill, with the following exceptions: First, 
the House bill specified that § 307(c)(l) applied to federal activity "whether within or 
outside of the coastal zone." This addition explicitly rejected the Court's geographical 
definition of "directly affecting." Second, the House bill adopted the exceptions set forth 
in NOAA's regulations to the CZMA regulations' "fully consistent" requirement. 15 
C.F.R. 930.32. Full consistency was required unless "(i) compliance was prohibited based 
upon the requirements of Federal law, or (ii) a circumstance arising after that manage-
ment program was approved, and unforeseen at the time of approval, presents a sub-
stantial obstacle that prevents the achievement of full consistency in conducting or 
supporting the activity." H.R. 4589, supra note 394. 
39!l S. REP. No. 512, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The new language for § 307(c)(1) read in 
part: "Each Federal agency conducting or supporting an activity significantly affecting 
the natural resources or land or water uses in the coastal zone shall conduct or support 
that activity in a manner which is fully consistent with the enforceable, mandatory 
policies of approved State management programs .... " 
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ing" in section 307(c)(1).397 The significance of effects depends on 
their context and intensity.398 The committee stressed that the 
substitution of "significantly affecting" was designed to reject the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of "directly affecting" in Interior 
v. California in two ways. The words were to be broadly con-
strued, not limited to the geographical location of the activity.399 
In addition, the phrase should include the reasonably forseeable 
consequences of federally conducted or supported activity.400 The 
committee affirmatively stated that it "intends that Federal OCS 
lease sales be subject to section 307(c)(1) Federal consistency pro-
visions."401 
Second, in order to narrow the focus of the bill, the Senate 
committee added the phrase, "to the natural resources or land or 
water uses in the coastal zone."402 This addition meant that the 
only significant effects of federally conducted or supported ac-
tivities which would trigger the CZMA consistency requirement 
would be those "to the natural resources or land or water uses in 
the coastal zone." Consequently, economic, social, or cultural ef-
fects, by themselves, could not trigger consistency review.403 How-
ever, should federal OCS activity cause a physical impact on 
ocean resources which in turn affected a coastal industry, such as 
commercial fishing, the federal activity would be subject to con-
sistency review.404 
Third, the bill altered the standard of federal consistency from 
"to the maximum extent practicable" to "fully consistent," with 
four exceptions.405 This change brought the statutory language 
397 [d. 
398 [d. at 8. The bill followed the Council of Environmental Quality regulations (40 
C.F.R. § 1508) in defining the significance of effects. 
399 [d. at 6-7. 
400 [d. 
401 [d. at 7. 
402 [d. at 9. 
403 [d. 
404 [d. The Committee intended to remedy a contrary interpretation by a federal 
district court in Kean v. Watt, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20618 (1982), which 
limited consistency review to physical, not economic, impacts. 
405 Federal activity had to be "fully consistent" unless it was: "i) undertaken to counter 
the immediate effects of an emergency declared by the President; ii) required by any 
provision of a Federal law which prevents consistency with any provision of an approved 
State coastal zone management program; or iv) undertaken pursuant to the Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)." S. 2324, supra note 
391. 
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into conformity with the standard of consistency set forth in 
NOAA regulations.406 
Finally, the bill's full consistency requirement was limited to 
"the enforceable mandatory policies of approved State manage-
ment programs."407 These include "the policies relevant to State 
constitutional provisions, laws, regulations and judicial decisions 
which comprise a State's management program."408 The recom-
mendations and standards incorporated into the state program 
were not binding. This requirement built upon existing reg-
ulations409 and was designed to prevent states from attempting to 
use vaguely worded policy statements to assert control over fed-
eral activities unrelated "to natural resources or land or water 
uses in the coastal zone." However, federal agencies were urged 
to "give substantial deference to a State's interpretation of en-
forceable, mandatory policies."410 
The Senate and House bills would remedy the narrow construc-
tion of "directly affecting" announced by the Supreme Court. 
Both bills substitute "significantly affecting" for "directly affect-
ing" in CZMA section 307(c)(1). This would insure that OCS lease 
sales would be subject to consistency review. Furthermore, the 
change in the consistency standard to "fully consistent," and the 
requirement that "substantial deference" be given to a state's 
interpretation of its "enforceable, mandatory policies," indicated 
that the states would play a major role in such consistency de-
terminations. However, the 98th Congress took no further action 
on either bill before the close of its second session. 
It is likely that Congress will readdress the issue this session in 
the context of the reauthorization of the CZMA. It will be a 
victory for state environmental protection if Congress rectifies 
the error committed by the Supreme Court in Interior v. Califor-
nia and restores the state/federal cooperative framework en-
visioned in the CZMA to protect the coastal zone. 
406 15 C.F.R. § 930.32 (1984). NOAA regulations define "to the maximum extent practic-
able" as "fully consistent." The Senate bill only adopted the first of NOAA's exceptions. 
See supra note 395. The committee should have retained the "unforeseen circumstances" 
exception. This would have provided a degree of flexibility which was missing in the 
Senate bill. Its inclusion would have more fully exhibited the intent of Congress, which 
recognized that, "leeway should be written into the law with respect to the activities of 
Federal agencies in connection with approved programs." H.R. REP. No. 1049, supra note 
99, at 20. 
407 S. REP. No. 512, supra note 396, at 11. 
40M Id. 
409 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.35, 930.39 (1984). 
410 S. REP. No. 512, supra note 396, at 10-11. 
